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C+IPPIN* AWAY AT COMPLIANCE +OW
COMPLIANCE PRO*RAM6 LO6E
LE*ITIMACY AN' IT6 IMPACT ON
UNET+ICAL BE+A9IOR
David Hess
*
AB6TRACT
Employee perceptions of an organization’s compliance program are
critical. A program that has lost legitimacy with its employees is not just
ineffective, but it creates more harm than good by leading to more unethical
behavior. This Article identifies ways in which compliance programs can
start to lose legitimacy, explains how that lost legitimacy leads to increased
wrongdoing, and then concludes by setting out some basic reforms focused
on helping stop this downward spiral and protecting the legitimacy of the
compliance function.
INTRO'UCTION
JumpVtarteG Ey tKe OrJani]ational 6entencinJ *uiGelineV oYer twenty
fiYe yearV aJo, compliance proJramV rapiGly VpreaG anG Eecame a common
practice
1
7oGay, compliance iV now itV own profeVVion
2
anG acaGemic fielG
of VtuGy

'eVpite tKeVe GeYelopmentV, tKe meGia iV Vtill tellinJ tKe Vame
VtorieV of Gramatic corporate compliance failureV tKat iV, a to[ic corporate
culture KaV leG to ViJnificant, anG often wiGeVpreaG, wronJful EeKaYior Ey
employeeV
4
For e[ample, tKe inYeVtiJation into BarclayV¶ inYolYement in
 3rofeVVor of BuVineVV Law, 6tepKen M RoVV 6cKool of BuVineVV at tKe UniYerVity of
MicKiJan J', UniYerVity of ,owa M$, 3K', 7Ke :Karton 6cKool of tKe UniYerVity of
3ennVylYania $n earlier YerVion of tKiV article waV preVenteG at tKe Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial anG Commercial Law $nnual 6ympoVium EmerJinJ 7renGV in
Corporate Enforcement anG Corporate Compliance
1 For a KiVtory of tKe GeYelopment of compliance proJramV, see 'aYiG +eVV, Ethical
Infrastructure and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy
Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 NYU J L & BU6 1, 24±40 201
2 CriVtie ForG & 'aYiG +eVV, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 4 J COR3 L 9, 92±9 2009
. See, e.g., COM3L,$NCENE7, KttpVwwwcompliancenetorJ laVt YiViteG $uJ 0, 2019
an orJani]ation of acaGemicV VtuGyinJ compliance
4 Jennifer :ellV, Transparency in the Face of Harassment: We Want the Facts on How
Corporations Deal with Sexual Harassment, 7ORON7O 67$R, Oct 29, 201, at B1 GiVcuVVinJ
alleJationV of a ³to[ic corporate culture´ at Nike tKat inYolYeG unfair pay practiceV anG GiVmiVVal
of alleJationV of Ve[ual KaraVVment Julie CreVwell et al, At Nike, Revolt Led by Women Leads to
Exodus of Male Executives, NY 7,ME6, $pr 2, 201, KttpVwwwnytimeVcom
201042EuVineVVnikewomenKtml VtatinJ tKat life for women at Nike KaG ³turneG to[ic´ Gue
to a culture tKat iJnoreG alleJationV of Ve[ual KaraVVment Eli]aEetK .niJKt, Uber Pays a $26
Billion Price of Toxic Culture, 6Y'NEY MORN,N* +ER$L' June 0, 201,
KttpVwwwVmKcomauEuVineVVuEerpayVa2EillionpriceforitVto[iccorporateculture
20100J[1[wKtml notinJ tKat tKe company¶V eVtimateG loVV of U6 20 Eillion in Yalue waV
Gue to a VerieV of VcanGalV, incluGinJ alleJeG tKeft of intellectual property, Ve[ual KaraVVment, anG
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tKe LonGon ,nterEank OffereG Rate L,BOR riJJinJ VcanGal pointeG to tKe
releYant Gepartment¶V focuV on meetinJ VKortterm financial tarJetV anG not
VerYinJ clientV¶ neeGV, a lack of articulateG anG VKareG YalueV to JuiGe
employeeV¶ GeciVion makinJ, anG unwillinJneVV of top manaJement to Kear
EaG newV

*eneral MotorV¶ failure to correct itV GeaGly iJnition VwitcK
proElem waV ElameG on a culture wKere eYeryone VouJKt, anG waV aEle to
aYoiG reVponViEility anG accountaEility, anG tKey feareG retaliation for
VpeakinJ up

$t :ellV FarJo, tKe corrupt croVVVellinJ VcanGal waV Gue to
an employee incentiYe VyVtem tKat VtronJly encouraJeG unetKical EeKaYior
RatKer tKan recoJni]inJ tKe VyVtematic preVVure placeG on employeeV,
:ellV FarJo took wKat inYeVtiJatorV calleG a ³narrow µtranVactional¶
approacK´ to any iVVueV tKat aroVe anG treateG tKem inGiYiGually in otKer
worGV, tKe company¶V attemptV to aGGreVV tKe proElemV focuVeG on
inGiYiGualV aV EaG actorV anG refuVeG to look at tKe influence of Vituational
preVVureV createG Ey company practiceV

Of courVe, tKoVe KeaGlineJraEEinJ VcanGalV of corporate cultureV tKat
preVVure employeeV to commit wronJGoinJ anGor not report tKe
wronJGoinJ tKat tKey oEVerYe are tKe e[ceptionV in termV of tKeir Vi]e anG
impact +oweYer, tKey are not tKe e[ceptionV in termV of tKeir uEiTuity For
many yearV, tKe EtKicV anG Compliance ,nitiatiYe KaV conGucteG a EuVineVV
etKicV VurYey

One of tKeir TueVtionV aVkV employeeV if tKey KaYe faceG
preVVure to compromiVe company VtanGarGV 6tartinJ in 2000, 14 of
employeeV VtateG tKat tKey KaG faceG VucK preVVure
9
:itK tKe e[ception of
2009, tKiV fiJure KaV alwayV Eeen in GouEle GiJitV anG reacKeG a KiJK of
workplace EullyinJ Jon 3icoult, What Went Awry at Wells Fargo? The Beaten Path of a Toxic
Culture, NY 7,ME6 Oct , 201, KttpVwwwnytimeVcom2011009MoEVwKatwentawry
atwellVfarJotKeEeatenpatKofato[iccultureKtml GiVcuVVinJ Kow to[ic corporate cultureV at
:ellV FarJo, VolkVwaJen, *M, anG VeteranV $ffairV, leG to wiGeVpreaG wronJGoinJ
 $N7+ONY 6$L=, 6$L= REV,E: $N ,N'E3EN'EN7 REV,E: OF B$RCL$Y6¶ BU6,NE66
3R$C7,CE6 ± 201
 $N7ON R V$LU.$6, RE3OR7 7O BO$R' OF',REC7OR6 OF*ENER$LMO7OR6 COM3$NY
RE*$R',N* ,*N,7,ON 6:,7C+ REC$LL6 22±, 2± 2014
 ,N'E3EN'EN7 ',REC7OR6 OF 7+E BO$R' OF :ELL6 F$R*O & COM3$NY 6$LE6
3R$C7,CE6 ,NVE67,*$7,ON RE3OR7 1, 1 201 $t :ellV FarJo, employee promotionV were
EaVeG KeaYily on ValeV performance Id. at 2 7KeVe limiteG promotion criteria Eecame
inVtitutionali]eG in tKe orJani]ation aV ³witneVVeV VaiG tKat ine[perienceG EankerV freTuently were
promoteG EaVeG on ValeV VucceVV anG Eecame ine[perienceG manaJerV wKo unGerVtooG tKat
VucceVV waV meaVureG Ey ValeV performance´ Id. 7KeVe manaJerV tKen preVVureG employeeV to
focuV only ValeV JoalV, anG in Vome caVeV eYen tauJKt employeeV Kow to manipulate tKe VyVtem to
aYoiG Getection Id. at  7Kere waV ViJnificant eYiGence tKat it waV tKiV preVVure, anG not
Vimply an inGiYiGual employee¶V GeVire for increaVeG compenVation, tKat fueleG tKe unetKical anG
illeJal ValeV practiceV Id. at  EYen wKen preVenteG witK tKeVe proElemV, manaJement refuVeG to
cKanJe tKe ValeV incentiYeV VyVtem for fear of reGucinJ ValeV anG inVteaG focuVeG on increaVeG
traininJ anG puniVKinJ of inGiYiGual wronJGoerV Id. at , 4
. See E7+,C6 & COM3L,$NCE ,N,7,$7,VE, 7+E 67$7E OF E7+,C6 & COM3L,$NCE ,N 7+E
:OR.3L$CE 1, 4 201
9. Id. at 
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1 in tKe moVt recent VurYey conGucteG in 201
10
,n aGGition, in 201, of
tKoVe employeeV tKat faceG preVVure to Yiolate VtanGarGV,  of tKem
VtateG tKat tKeir company rewarGeG ³TueVtionaEle practiceV´
11
$monJ tKoVe
employeeV tKat VtateG tKey GiG not face preVVure, onetKirG alVo VtateG tKat
tKeir company rewarGeG ³TueVtionaEle practiceV´
12
$ properly implementeG compliance proJram VKoulG reGuce tKoVe
preVVureV on employeeV anG correct miVJuiGeG financial incentiYeV
+oweYer, an effectiYe compliance proJram reTuireV tKat tKe company¶V top
manaJement are inYolYeG in oYerViJKt, tKe company GeYoteV Vufficient
orJani]ational reVourceV to compliance, anG manaJerV tKrouJKout tKe
orJani]ation KaYe a commitment to compliance YalueV
1
Unfortunately,
many corporationV are unwillinJ to make tKe commitment to enVure tKey
KaYe a wellreVourceG compliance proJram in place tKat iV VupporteG Ey an
etKical corporate culture ,nVteaG, Gue to tKe ³compliance Jame,´ many
corporationV KaYe little incentiYe to moYe mucK EeyonG VymEolic effortV
14
7Ke ³commoGification of compliance´ Gue to inGiVtinJuiVKaEle proJramV
anG VolutionV anG tKe inaEility of reJulatorV to eYaluate compliance
proJram effectiYeneVV,
1
createV tKe followinJ ruVe
7KiV iV a Jame tKat VeekV optimal compliance e[penGitureV to minimi]e
liaEility riVkV, JiYeV all playerV moral anG leJal coYer, placateV
conVtituencieV witK tKe appearance of leJitimacy, anG offerV Eeautifully
crafteG imaJeV of leaGerVKip anG JoYernance witK inteJrity 7KiV Jame iV
aliJneG witK a reJulatory VyVtem tKat poVVeVVeV a Yery limiteG capacity for
GetermininJ tKe effectiYeneVV anG JenuineneVV of compliance, anG eYen
leVV commitment to aJJreVViYely uVinJ tKe corporate criminal law
1
7KiV approacK to compliance iV not only a ViJnificant waVte of time anG
reVourceV for tKoVe companieV tKat enJaJe in merely KalfKearteG attemptV
at compliance, Eut it coulG alVo reVult in an increaVe of wronJGoinJ 7Ke
focuV of tKiV $rticle iV wKen anG Kow a poorly implementeG compliance
proJram can actually leaG to more wronJGoinJ For e[ample, if
manaJement YiewV VKortterm EuVineVV intereVtV aV conflictinJ witK tKe
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
1. See CKriVtine 3arker & ViEeke LeKmann, Corporate Compliance Systems: Could They
Make Any Difference?, 41 $'M,N & 6OC¶Y , 2±29 2009
14 :illiam 6 Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal Law, 14
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS 71, 112±14 201
1. See EuJene 6olteV, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs:
Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms, 14 NYU J L & BU6 9, 90±4
201 GeVcriEinJ tKe YariouV cKallenJeV in meaVurinJ tKe effectiYeneVV of compliance proJramV,
incluGinJ lack of aJreement on metricV anG lack of appropriate Gata
1 Laufer, supra note 14 at 112±1 ³Ultimately, VtakeKolGerV in tKiV Jame Veek to protect anG
enKance tKeir poVitionV witKout GiVturEinJ tKe eTuiliErium anG, remarkaEly, witKout concern for
wKetKer tKeir effortV actually affect rateV of offenGinJ EeKaYior´ Id. at 11
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compliance proJram, tKen tKey may GeciGe to allow an e[ception to a
compliance proJram rule 7KiV e[ception cKipV away at tKe compliance
proJram¶V leJitimacy anG can Go laVtinJ GamaJe OYer time, Gue to
repeateG e[ceptionV anG otKer proElemV iGentifieG Eelow, tKe proElem
feVterV 7Ke compliance proJram not only EecomeV ineffectiYe, Eut it leaGV
to increaVeG wronJGoinJ
7KiV $rticle proceeGV aV followV 3art , preVentV two Gifferent, Eut often
workinJ in tanGem, wayV tKat corporate actorV can inaGYertently GiminiVK
tKe leJitimacy of tKe compliance proJram 3art ,, GiVcuVVeV Kow an
illeJitimate compliance proJram can leaG to an increaVe in unetKical anG
illeJal EeKaYior 3art ,,, VuJJeVtV reformV to Kelp protect aJainVt tKiV
proceVV of a compliance proJram Vlowly loVinJ itV leJitimacy witKin tKe
orJani]ation
I +OW COMPLIANCE PRO*RAM6 6LOWLY C+IP AWAY
Many leJal commentatorV KaYe critici]eG tKe effectiYeneVV of
compliance proJramV 6ome, uVinJ VucK termV aV ³coVmetic compliance´ or
³paper proJramV,´ focuV on manaJerV intentionally failinJ to implement a
compliance proJramV
1
ConVeTuently, tKe compliance proJram EecomeV
GecoupleG from actual practice in tKe orJani]ation in a manner tKat cauVeV
tKe compliance proJram, anG tKe YalueV EeKinG tKe proJram, to loVe
leJitimacy
1
$V witK GecouplinJ for many typeV of orJani]ational practiceV,
KoweYer, tKiV proceVV can alVo EeJin witK unintentional manaJerial
EeKaYior
19
7KiV 3art GiVcuVVeV Kow tKat inaGYertent GecouplinJ proceVV can
Vtart to occur 7Ke followinJ KiJKliJKtV recent reVearcK tKat GiVcuVVeV two
Jeneral wayV tKat compliance proJramV Vtart to cKip away
A RE6I6TANCE TOC+IEF ET+IC6 AN'COMPLIANCEOFFICER6
7Ke CKief EtKicV anG Compliance Officer CECO²wKicK may Jo Ey
Gifferent titleV GepenGinJ on tKe orJani]ation²iV tKe inGiYiGual in cKarJe of
GeViJninJ anG implementinJ tKe company¶V compliance proJram For
CECOV to effectiYely Go tKeir MoE, tKey muVt KaYe leJitimacy, wKicK iV tKe
1 ForG & +eVV, supra note 2, at 94±9 GeVcriEinJ ³paper proJramV´ aV compliance
proJramV tKat reVult wKen ³corporationV aGopt policieV anG proceGureV on paper Eut Go not emEeG
tKem into tKeir actual operationV´ .imEerly ' .rawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure
of Negotiated Governance, 1 :$6+ U L4 4, 4, 491±9 200 arJuinJ tKat companieV
can Veek to aYoiG liaEility witKout cKanJinJ proElematic practiceV Ey Vimply ³mimickinJ an
effectiYe compliance VyVtem´ See 3arker & LeKmann, supra note 1, at 9±11 reYiewinJ
criticiVmV of compliance proJramV, incluGinJ manaJement intentionally implementinJ compliance
proJramV in a way tKat GoeV cKanJe company practiceV
1. See infra 3art ,,
19 3atricia Bromley & :alter : 3owell, From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk:
Decoupling in the Contemporary World,  $C$' M*M7 $NN$L6 1, 2 2012
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perception Ey otKerV tKat tKeir actionV are proper anG appropriate
20
7KiV
perception of leJitimacy iV eVVential EecauVe CECOV are VettinJ tKe
VtanGarG for etKical EeKaYior in tKe orJani]ation anG may Ee aVkinJ
employeeV to unGertake actiYitieV tKat tKey are uncomfortaEle GoinJ eJ,
reportinJ miVconGuct
21
Recent reVearcK finGV tKat CECOV reJularly face cKallenJeV to tKeir
leJitimacy
22
FirVt, CECOV loVe leJitimacy in tKe eyeV of otKerV witKin tKe
orJani]ation EecauVe tKey face cKallenJeV in meaVurinJ tKe effectiYeneVV of
tKeir work anG tKe compliance proJram, anG encounter oEVtacleV in
GemonVtratinJ Kow tKey aGG Yalue to tKe orJani]ation
2
6econG, many
manaJerV anG employeeV EelieYe tKat tKey are etKical people anG Go not
neeG tKe aVViVtance of tKe CECO to enVure tKeir compliance witK tKe ruleV,
eVpecially in tKe aEVence of a ruleV Yiolation criViV tKat woulG proYiGe Girect
eYiGence to tKe contrary
24
,n aGGition, manaJerV are leVV likely to Yiew
tKemVelYeV aV lackinJ etKicV knowleGJe compareG to knowleGJe from otKer
EuVineVV GiVciplineV
2
7KirG, CECOV loVe leJitimacy EecauVe compliance iV
often YieweG aV an impeGiment to acKieYinJ EuVineVV imperatiYeV
2
7KiV
GoeV not neceVVarily mean a complete reMection of tKe proJram, Eut
manaJerV may Veek VelectiYe enforcement of ruleV Ey aYoiGinJ tKe ruleV tKat
tKey perceiYe aV moVt Girectly claVKinJ witK EuVineVV JoalV
2
FourtK, tKe
orJani]ation¶V leJal Gepartment may Yiew tKe work of tKe CECO aV
conflictinJ witK tKeir Joal of protectinJ tKe orJani]ation
2
BecauVe tKe
leJal function witKin orJani]ationV KaV ViJnificant leJitimacy,
29
tKe
orJani]ation often prioriti]eV tKe leJal Gepartment¶V protection JoalV oYer
tKe CECO¶V JoalV of iGentifyinJ anG correctinJ etKical anG leJal proElemV,
wKicK furtKer GiminiVKeV tKe CECO¶V autKority anG leJitimacy
0
B MANA*ERRATIONALI=ATION6
Rationali]ationV anG tKe relateG concept of ³moral GiVenJaJement,´ are
lonJrecoJni]eG aV wayV tKat inGiYiGualV are aEle to enJaJe in wronJGoinJ,
for tKeir own Eenefit or tKe Eenefit of tKeir orJani]ation, witKout YiewinJ
20 LinGa .leEe 7reYixo et al, Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of
Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 12 OR* BE+$V & +UM 'EC,6,ON
3ROCE66E6 1, 1 2014
21. Id.
22. Id. at 19±90
2. Id. at 191
24. Id. at 191, 194
2. Id. at 194
2. Id.
2. Id.
2. Id.
29 7KiV leYel of leJitimacy iV creGiteG to tKe lonJVtanGinJ KiVtory of corporationV KaYinJ a
leJal Gepartment, tKe VtanGinJ accorGeG tKe leJal profeVVion, anG tKe leJal Gepartment¶V role in
protectinJ tKe orJani]ation Id.
0. Id.
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tKemVelYeV aV YiolatinJ Vocial normV on etKical EeKaYior
1
tKe inGiYiGual
YiewV KiV or Ker action aV an e[ception to tKe etKical norm aV oppoVeG to a
Yiolation of tKat norm
2
E[ampleV of VucK rationali]ationV, or
GiVenJaJement VtrateJieV, incluGe tKe e[cuVeV tKat tKe action iV not
tecKnically illeJal, no one iV actually KarmeG Ey tKe action, anG loyalty to
tKe actor¶V inJroup memEerV iV more important tKan oEliJationV to EroaGer
Vociety

Moral GiVenJaJement in orJani]ationV iV GeVcriEeG aV followV
>M@oral GiVenJaJement may aVViVt inGiYiGualV in more eaVily anG
e[peGiently makinJ unetKical GeciVionV tKat are in tKe orJani]ation¶V
intereVt Moral GiVenJaJement may eaVe unetKical GeciVionmakinJ Ey
preemptinJ tKe pVycKoloJical GiVcomfort    e[perienceG Ey inGiYiGualV
at tKe proVpect of makinJ an orJani]ationally YalueG Eut morally
TueVtionaEle GeciVion    Moral GiVenJaJement may alVo e[peGite
unetKical GeciVionV Ey operatinJ to VKielG competinJ YalueV from aGGinJ
to tKe coJnitiYe comple[ity of tKe GeciVion
4
Rationali]ationV anG moral GiVenJaJement are wellrecoJni]eG
conceptV for unGerVtanGinJ wKy inGiYiGualV commit wronJGoinJ in
orJani]ational VettinJV, Eut tKeVe conceptV alVo come into play wKen
unGerVtanGinJ wKy compliance proJramV Vtart to Ereak Gown ,n tKiV
conte[t, tKe concern iV tKat eYen if a compliance proJram workV aV GeViJneG
anG catcKeV tKe rule Yiolation, tKen tKe rule Yiolation may Ee iJnoreG Gue to
manaJerV rationali]inJ away tKe neceVVity to take correctiYe action 7KiV
can Ee a key Vtep in tKe cKippinJ away of tKe effectiYeneVV of tKe
compliance proJram
$V an illuVtration of tKiV proceVV, a recent VtuGy finGV tKat many
manaJerV uVe rationali]ationV to aYoiG GealinJ witK oEVerYeG miVconGuct

7KeVe reVearcKerV VtuGieG occupational frauG, wKicK iV frauG committeG Ey
an employee aJainVt KiV or Ker employer

Occupational frauG may Ee
committeG inGiYiGually Ey tKe employee or Ey workinJ witK a cuVtomer of
tKe employer, VucK aV Ey inflatinJ a contract price for purpoVeV of funGinJ a
EriEe paiG Ey tKe cuVtomer to tKe employee

7Ke VtuGy iGentifieG a Yariety
of rationali]ationV manaJerV uVeG to conYince tKemVelYeV to oYerlook
1. See $le[anGer Newman et al, Moral Disengagement at Work: A Review and Research
Agenda, J BU6 E7+,C6 at ± 2019 notinJ tKe ³ViJnificant oYerlap´ Eetween tKe conceptV of
rationali]ationV anG moral GiVenJaJement
2 Blake E $VKfortK & VikaV $nanG, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 2
RE6 OR* BE+$V 1, 1±1 200
. Id. at 1±19, 21
4 Celia Moore, Moral Disengagement in Processes of Organizational Corruption, 0 J BU6
E7+,C6 129, 12 200 empKaViV omitteG
 'aYiG 6KepKerG & Mark Button, Organizational Inhibitions to Addressing Occupational
Fraud: A Theory of Differential Rationalization, 40 'EV,$N7 BE+$V 91, 91 2019
. Id.
. Id. at 94
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inVtanceV of occupational frauG tKey GiVcoYer

ManaJerV may oYerlook
frauG aV a way to protect tKe perceiYeG financial intereVtV of tKe
orJani]ation For e[ample, iJnorinJ tKe Yiolation aYoiGV tKe operational
GiVruption tKat woulG Ee cauVeG Ey GealinJ witK tKe frauG
9
anG aYoiGV any
neJatiYe commercial impact tKat coulG reVult from tKe puElic GiVcloVure of
manaJement¶V failure
40
,n one orJani]ation, manaJement refuVeG to
inYeVtiJate claimV of frauG EecauVe GoinJ Vo woulG Jo aJainVt tKe
orJani]ation¶V core Yalue of truVtinJ itV employeeV
41
ManaJerV may alVo
oYerlook frauG to protect tKemVelYeV 7Key ³fear tKe e[poVure of frauG anG
otKer illeJalitieV witKin tKeir GepartmentV    will reflect poorly on tKem
anG tKreaten tKeir >career@ proVpectV´
42
OYerall, tKe reVearcKerV founG ³manaJerV uVe tKe Vame rationali]ationV
aV occupational >frauG@ offenGerV, at timeV mi[inJ a EefuGGlinJ cocktail of
VelfMuVtificationV, in orGer to maintain tKeir perception of tKemVelYeV aV
reVponViEle, moral perVonV´
4
7o reGuce tKe oYerlookinJ of frauG, tKe
autKorV aGYocate for orJani]ationV to Girectly tarJet tKoVe rationali]ationV
44
For tKiV $rticle, tKe ViJnificance of tKeir finGinJV iV in VKowinJ one way
tKat tKe leJitimacy of a company¶V compliance proJram VtartV to Geteriorate
$ ³culture of compliance´ iV not poVViEle wKen manaJerV are aEle to
rationali]e away tKeir compliance GutieV
C 6UMMARY
3art , KiJKliJKteG recent reVearcK VKowinJ two wayV in wKicK
compliance proJramV can Vtart to loVe leJitimacy ,n many orJani]ationV,
tKe leJitimacy of tKe CECO¶V poVition anG work iV cKallenJeG from tKe
EeJinninJ Gue to otKer orJani]ational actorV¶ perceptionV of compliance anG
etKicV 7KiV leJitimacy iV furtKer cKippeG away wKen manaJerV rationali]e
away tKeir compliance oEliJationV 7KiV iV tKe Vtart of a GownwarG Vpiral
3art ,, e[ploreV tKe continuation of tKiV GownwarG Vpiral anG tKe reVearcK
VKowinJ Kow tKiV may reVult in increaVeG unetKical EeKaYior
II T+E 'AN*ER6 OF FAULTY COMPLIANCE PRO*RAM6
$ compliance proJram tKat lackV leJitimacy iV not MuVt ineffectiYe Eut iV
a riVk factor for increaVeG wronJGoinJ in tKe orJani]ation 7Ke Eroken
winGowV tKeory of GiVorGer proYiGeV a Vimple, introGuctory e[ample ,n
VKort, tKiV tKeory VuJJeVtV tKat YiViEle ViJnV of GiVorGer leaG to aGGitional
. Id. at 9
9. Id. at 9±
40. Id. at 9
41. Id. notinJ tKat tKe orJani]ation¶V aGKerence to tKe Yalue of truVt KaG Eecome warpeG anG
waV now uVeG aV ³a VKielG for criminality ratKer tKan a protection aJainVt it´
42. Id. at 92
4. Id. at 9
44. Id. at 9
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GiVorGer
4
Recent reVearcK e[panGV upon tKiV tKeory anG VKowV tKat tKiV
proElem iV e[acerEateG wKen actorV oEVerYe tKe wronJful EeKaYior in Girect
Yiolation of proKiEitionV on tKat conGuct
4
ReVearcKerV conGucteG multiple e[perimentV on tKe impact of ³anti
litter´ proKiEition ViJnV on inGiYiGualV¶ litterinJ EeKaYior wKen litter waV
YiViEly preVent in tKe area anG wKen it waV aEVent
4
MoVt releYant for our
GiVcuVVion, tKe reVearcKerV founG tKe preVence of a proKiEition ViJn in tKe
area wKere litter waV preVent maGe noncompliance more Valient anG leG to
increaVeG litterinJ compareG to a Vituation wKere tKere waV litterinJ preVent
Eut no proKiEition ViJn
4
,n aGGition, not only GiG tKe clear eYiGence of
noncompliance witK tKe rule in tKe preVence of a proKiEition ViJn furtKer
increaVe noncompliance witK tKat rule, Eut it alVo increaVeG non
compliance witK otKer normV of appropriate EeKaYior
49
For e[ample, tKe
preVence of Jraffiti near a Jraffiti proKiEition ViJn wKicK maGe tKe non
compliance more Valient increaVeG litterinJ compareG to a VettinJ witK
Jraffiti Eut no proKiEition ViJn
0
By contraVt, tKe lack of Jraffiti Ey a
Jraffiti proKiEition ViJn maGe compliance witK a norm more Valient anG
reGuceG tKe amount of litterinJ
1
$V it relateV to orJani]ational compliance,
one ³muVt look at Kow tKe VtateG ruleV anG YalueV of tKe corporation are at
oGGV witK tKe practiceV anG implieG YalueV, aV tKiV will Vtimulate e[tra rule
offenGinJ aV it GeleJitimi]eV compliance wKen orJani]ationV VtreVV YalueV
in line witK tKe law tKat are commonly Eroken in practice´
2
7Ke followinJ
VectionV proYiGe a Erief reYiew of tKeory anG eYiGence VupportinJ tKe
arJument tKat an illeJitimate compliance proJram can leaG to increaVeG
wronJGoinJ
A T+E IMPACT OF AWEAK ET+ICAL INFRA6TRUCTURE
EtKical EeKaYior witKin orJani]ationV inYolYeV inGiYiGual factorV,
influenceV from tKe orJani]ational enYironment, anG tKeir interaction

:Ken e[ecutiYeV attempt to manaJe tKe orJani]ational enYironment, tKey
muVt conViGer EotK tKe orJani]ation¶V formal VyVtem of ruleV, incluGinJ
4 For an empirical VtuGy VupportinJ tKiV tKeory, see .eeV .ei]er et al, The Spreading of
Disorder, 22 6C, 11, 11 'ec 12, 200
4 .eeV .ei]er et al, The Reversal Effect of Prohibition Signs, 14 *ROU3 3ROCE66E6 &
,N7ER*ROU3 REL 1, 1 2011
4. Id. at 4
4. Id.
49. Id. at ± Vee reVultV of VtuGy 2
0. Id.
1. Id. at  Vee tKe reVultV of VtuGy 24
2 BenMamin Yan RooiM & $Gam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational
Processes of Deviancy,  $'M,N 6C,, June 2019, at 1, 9
. See generally LinGa .leEe 7reYixo, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-
Situation Interactionist Model, 11 $C$' M*M7 REV 01 passim 19 GeYelopinJ a moGel
tKat VKowV Kow etKical GeciVion makinJ in EuVineVV inYolYeV an interaction Eetween inGiYiGual
cKaracteriVticV anG Vituational YariaEleV
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tKeir enforcement anG tKe informal VyVtem of influenceV
4
,n aGGition, tKe
formal anG informal VyVtemV are emEeGGeG witKin tKe etKical climate of tKe
orJani]ation, wKicK iV tKe employeeV¶ VKareG perceptionV of etKical
e[pectationV anG interperVonal relationV witKin tKe orJani]ation

ReVearcKerV KaYe GeYelopeG an etKical infraVtructure moGel tKat VKowV
Kow tKe formal VyVtem iV emEeGGeG witKin tKe informal VyVtem, wKicK iV
tKen emEeGGeG witKin tKe etKical climate

7Ke VtrenJtK of an
orJani]ation¶V infraVtructure GepenGV on Kow conViVtent tKe tKree partV are
witK eacK otKer an apparently wellGeViJneG formal VyVtem tKat iV rooteG in
an unetKical informal VyVtem anG climate will not Ee effectiYe

From tKiV
moGel, tKey KypotKeVi]eG tKat tKe relationVKip Eetween tKe leYel of
implementation of an etKical infraVtructure anG employeeV¶ etKical EeKaYior
woulG Ee curYilinear anG not linear

,f an orJani]ation VtartV witK no
etKical infraVtructure, VucK aV no compliance proJram, tKen tKere will Ee a
EaVeline leYel of unetKical EeKaYior :Ken tKoVe employeeV confront etKical
iVVueV in tKe workplace, tKey muVt rely on tKeir VenVe of etKicV to Getermine
tKe morally correct action
9
Of courVe, for a Yariety of reaVonV, not all
employeeV will EeKaYe etKically, anG tKere will Ee Vome leYel unetKical
EeKaYior
0
7Kat leYel of unetKical EeKaYior will Grop witK a VtronJ etKical
infraVtructure EecauVe employeeV will Ee traineG on appropriate etKical
GeciVion makinJ for tKeir MoEV, local Vocial normV will encouraJe etKical
EeKaYior, anG Vo on
1
,f tKe company KaV a weak etKical infraVtructure,
KoweYer, tKen we woulG e[pect an increaVe in unetKical EeKaYior aV
compareG to tKe EaVeline leYel
2
,n Erief, tKe reaVoninJ iV tKat
:Ken a VtronJ etKical infraVtructure iV in place, inGiYiGualV EeKaYe
etKically EecauVe tKe orJani]ation iV tellinJ tKem tKat tKey KaYe to Go Vo
+oweYer, wKen a weak infraVtructure iV in place, inGiYiGualV Go not
perceiYe tKe etKical GimenVionV of tKe Vituation nor Go tKey VenVe any Geep
etKical conYiction from tKe orJani]ation ConVeTuently, etKical EeKaYior iV
leaVt likely wKen an etKical infraVtructure iV weak

4 $nn E 7enErunVel et al, Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical Infrastructure
in Organizations, 1 6OC JU67 RE6 2, 2±94 200
. Id. at 29±9
. Id.
. Id. at 0
. Id. at 29±9
9. Id. at 29
0. See LinGa .leEe 7reYixo & MicKael E Brown, Managing to be Ethical: Debunking Five
Business Ethics Myths, 1 $C$' M*M7 E;EC 9, 9±2 2004 GeEunkinJ tKe mytK tKat it iV
eaVy to Ee etKical in EuVineVV Ey VKowinJ Kow etKical GeciVion makinJ iV comple[, reTuireV moral
awareneVV, inYolYeV a multiVtaJe proceVV, anG iV maGe more comple[ Ey tKe orJani]ational
conte[t
1. See 7enErunVel et al, supra note 4, at 2±9 GiVcuVVinJ tKe roleV of tKe informal anG
formal communication, VurYeillance, anG VanctioninJ VyVtemV
2. Id. at 29
. Id. at 299
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,f tKere waV no etKical infraVtructure, tKen tKe inGiYiGual woulG rely on
KiV or Ker own moral reaVoninJ :itK a weak infraVtructure, tKe
orJani]ation iV VenGinJ tKe meVVaJe to tKe inGiYiGual tKat tKoVe etKical
concernV Go not matter for GoinJ KiV or Ker MoE
4
7KiV iV conViVtent witK tKe
Eroken winGowV tKeory of GiVorGer GiVcuVVeG aEoYe

$ compliance
proJram tKat KaV loVt leJitimacy anG iV not conViVtent witK tKe reVt of tKe
etKical infraVtructure callV attention to tKe nonconformance anG furtKer
GeleJitimi]eV compliance

7Ke ne[t Vection Eriefly reYiewV Vome of tKe
empirical eYiGence in Vupport of tKat e[pectation
B T+E'AN*ER6 OF ILLE*ITIMATECOMPLIANCE PRO*RAM6
7Ke Jeneral claim of a weak etKical infraVtructure leaGinJ to more
unetKical EeKaYior KaV Vupport from reVearcK on compliance anG etKicV
proJramV BaVeG on a VurYey of oYer 10,000 employeeV of larJe $merican
companieV, one VtuGy founG tKat tKe employeeV¶ perception of tKe
companieV¶ compliance proJram influenceG tKe proJram¶V effectiYeneVV

MoVt importantly for tKiV $rticle¶V concernV, a compliance proJram tKat
lackeG leJitimacy witK employeeV²tKat iV, a compliance proJram YieweG
aV operatinJ primarily to protect top manaJement from Elame for
compliance failureV²KaG a neJatiYe relationVKip witK tKe inGicatorV for an
effectiYe compliance proJram

$ compliance proJram witKout leJitimacy
waV not MuVt ineffectiYe Eut waV aVVociateG witK more unetKical conGuct,
leVV etKical awareneVV, anG a lower likeliKooG of reportinJ EaG newV
VeekinJ aGYice anG reportinJ YiolationV
9
ReVearcKerV reacKeG a Vimilar concluVion in a metaanalyViV of 1
VtuGieV relateG to etKical culture, etKical climate, coGeV of conGuct, anG
otKer YariaEleV relateG to unetKical EeKaYior in tKe workplace
0
7Key founG
tKat a properly enforceG coGe of conGuct GecreaVeG unetKical EeKaYior, Eut
tKe Vimple e[iVtence of a coGe of conGuct, after controllinJ for perceiYeG
coGe enforcement anG corporate culture, increaVeG unetKical EeKaYior
1
OtKer reVearcKerV Vummari]eG tKoVe finGinJV Ey VtatinJ tKat ³employeeV
can Yiew tKe mere e[iVtence of a coGe aV a neJatiYe ViJn tKat tKe coGe
4 ³$ weak etKical infraVtructure iV a KouVe Euilt on VanG it VuJJeVtV tKat tKe etKical
principleV or YalueV in TueVtion are relatiYely unimportant ConYerVely, a VtronJ etKical
infraVtructure iV a KouVe Euilt on rock it VuJJeVtV tKat VucK YalueV are ViJnificant´ Id. at 29
. See supra noteV 4±1 GeVcriEinJ tKe Eroken winGowV tKeory of GiVorGer anG recent
empirical reVearcK tKat e[panGV upon tKat tKeory
 Yan RooiM & Fine, supra note 2, at 9
. See LinGa .leEe 7reYixo et al, Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and
What Hurts, 41 C$L,F M*M7 REV 11, 1± 1999
. Id. at 1±9
9. Id.
0 Jennifer J .iVK*epKart et al, Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: Meta-Analytic
Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 9 J $33L,E' 36YC+OL 1, 10, 19
2010
1. Id. at 10, 19, 21
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repreVentV winGow GreVVinJ only, tKuV proGucinJ a cynical reVponVe tKat
leaGV to more unetKical EeKaYior´
2
Finally, TualitatiYe reVearcK VKowV Kow tKiV proElem playeG out in one
company

7KiV waV a caVe VtuGy on an $merican mutual life inVurance
company tKat KaG aGopteG a compliance proJram to Geal witK reJulationV
on GeceptiYe ValeV practiceV,
4
Eut tKe proJram waV GefectiYe in many
wayV

$ltKouJK tKe company pronounceG to itV employeeV tKat tKe
company woulG not enJaJe in tKe GeceptiYe practiceV eYen if tKeir
competitorV GiG, tKe company faileG to aGopt an effectiYe VyVtem to
monitor VucK practiceV anG actually encouraJeG VucK practiceV Ey payinJ
ValeV commiVVionV on tranVactionV tKat were in fact GeceptiYe

7Ke
company¶V compliance traininJ waV focuVeG primarily on enVurinJ
employeeV KaG correctly completeG a form tKat reTuireG tKem to mark tKe
Eo[ Ey ³YeV, , unGerVtanG anG comply´ for twenty Gifferent VtatementV

7Ke company¶V monitorinJ of compliance witK tKe ruleV waV infreTuent anG
incomplete, anG employeeV cauJKt YiolatinJ tKe ruleV typically receiYeG
only a warninJ

,n aGGition, employeeV¶ KiVtory of YiolationV KaG no
impact on tKeir aEility to receiYe a promotion
9
'ue to tKe importance of
tKe ValeV Jroup, otKer GepartmentV, incluGinJ reJulatory compliance, KaG no
power to furtKer GiVcipline ruleV YiolatorV
0
$ltKouJK tKe compliance proJram lackeG leJitimacy witK employeeV, it
KaG tKe formal VyVtem pieceV in place to JiYe it leJitimacy witK e[ternal
VtakeKolGerV
1
,n reVponVe to tKe compliance proJram tKat KaG Eecome
clearly GecoupleG from actual practice, employeeV GiG not try to preVVure
tKe company to implement tKe proJram to meet tKoVe e[ternal e[pectationV,
Eut inVteaG ³aGopteG a cynical Yiew of tKe GecoupleG proJram, anG aV a
reVult of itV internal illeJitimacy, EeJan to Yiolate tKe formal compliance
ruleV in a wiGeVpreaG faVKion´
2
EYentually, after many yearV, tKe
orJani]ation alVo loVt e[ternal leJitimacy wKen complaintV eYentually
reVulteG in ViJnificant fineV anG tKe Vettlement of a claVV action lawVuit fileG
Ey oYer ten million policy KolGerV

2 LinGa .leEe 7reYixo et al, (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations,  $NNU$L REV
36YC+OL , 9 2014
 7ammy L MacLean & MicKael BenKam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship
Between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 
$C$' OFM*M7 J 1499, 1499 2010
4. Id. at 102
. Id. at 10±0
. Id. at 10±0
. Id. at 10±0
. Id. at 109
9. Id.
0. Id.
1. Id. at 110 7Ke autKorV refer to tKiV aV a ³GiVVonant leJitimacy perceptionV´ Id.
2. Id. at 11
. Id. at 11
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C 6UMMARY
Employee perceptionV of an orJani]ation¶V compliance proJram are
critical
4
$ proJram tKat KaV loVt leJitimacy witK itV employeeV iV not MuVt
ineffectiYe Eut can KaYe a neJatiYe impact on compliance conVeTuently, it
can leaG to more unetKical anG eYen poVViEly illeJal EeKaYior LeJitimacy
can Ee loVt wKen employeeV reali]e tKat tKe company KaV only aGopteG tKe
formal aVpectV of a compliance proJram to protect manaJement from Elame
anG meet tKe leJitimacy GemanGV of e[ternal VtakeKolGerV, VucK aV
enforcement attorneyV 7KiV can Ee referreG to aV compliance theater, aV tKe
compliance perVonnel are primarily in place to perform for tKe e[ternal
VtakeKolGerV 3erKapV more commonly, KoweYer, manaJerV, tKouJK not
intenGinJ to VaEotaJe tKe compliance proJram, Vlowly reGuce tKe proJram¶V
leJitimacy Ey not reVpectinJ tKe role of tKe CECO, anG rationali]inJ away
tKe oEliJation to enforce tKe proJram

:Ken employeeV witneVV an
ineffectiYe compliance proJram in tKe miGVt of wronJGoinJ, a VtronJ
GownwarG Vpiral EeJinV 7Ke eroGinJ leJitimacy of tKe compliance proJram
may not KaYe a ViJnificant impact at firVt, Eut if left uncKeckeG tKe
wronJGoinJ EecomeV inVtitutionali]eG anG new memEerV are Vociali]eG into
tKoVe practiceV

III 6TEP6 TOWAR'6 EN6URIN* T+E LE*ITIMACY OF
COMPLIANCE
7KiV 3art VetV out Vome EaVic reformV focuVeG on KelpinJ Vtop tKiV
GownwarG Vpiral anG protectinJ tKe leJitimacy of tKe compliance function
7Ke reformV in tKe firVt Vection are focuVeG on GeYelopinJ anG protectinJ
tKe leJitimacy of tKe compliance function in all corporationV 7Ke VeconG
Vection iV focuVeG on encouraJinJ corporationV to monitor tKe compliance
proceVV for purpoVeV of recoJni]inJ tKe neeG for early interYention
A PROTECTIN* T+ELE*ITIMACY OFCOMPLIANCE
$V GeVcriEeG in 3art ,, tKe compliance function KaV a leJitimacy
proElem in many orJani]ationV 7o Kelp protect aJainVt leJitimacy
proElemV, tKere are two VtepV tKat an orJani]ation VKoulG take anG, perKapV,
VKoulG Eecome part of tKe OrJani]ational 6entencinJ *uiGelineV

FirVt,
tKe EoarG of GirectorV VKoulG KaYe a VtanGinJ compliance committee

Ne[t, tKe CECO poVition VKoulG Ee a VtanGalone poVition ie, Veparate
4. Id. at 11
. See supra 3art ,
. See generally $VKfortK & $nanG, supra note 2 VettinJ out tKe tKree founGationV for tKe
normali]ation of corruption in orJani]ationV inVtitutionali]ation, rationali]inJ, anG Vociali]ation
. See +eVV, supra note 1, at 2±41 GeVcriEinJ tKe OrJani]ational 6entencinJ *uiGelineV
. Id. see infra noteV 90±9
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from tKe leJal function anG report, aV well aV Ee accountaEle, to tKe EoarG
of GirectorV
9
7Ke EoarG of GirectorV iV ultimately reVponViEle for enVurinJ tKe
orJani]ation KaV an appropriate compliance proJram in place
90
7Ke EoarG
VKoulG confirm tKe compliance proJram iV effectiYe, KaV aGeTuate VtaffinJ
anG reVourceV, anG tKat tKe CECO KaV Vufficient inGepenGence anG
autKority
91
,n aGGition, tKere are a JrowinJ numEer of callV for tKe EoarG to
Ee Girectly inYolYeG in enVurinJ tKe corporation KaV an etKical corporate
culture
92
Finally, tKe EoarG VKoulG approYe anG oYerVee any remeGial
meaVureV recommenGeG Ey tKe CECO in reVponVe to a failure of tKe
compliance proJram
9
7Ke EoarG VKoulG KaYe a VtanGinJ compliance committee to oYerVee tKe
CECO anG tKe compliance proJram
94
Currently, it iV not a common
practice for a EoarG of GirectorV to KaYe a compliance committee One VtuGy
of all companieV e[cept financial VerYiceV liVteG on tKe RuVVell 000
Eetween 2001 anG 201 founG tKat only  of firmV KaG a compliance or
reJulatory committee, anG 0 KaG an etKicV committee
9
$ recent VtuGy
of tKe 6&3 00 founG tKat only 12 of companieV KaG a compliance
committee
9
$ compliance committee reTuirement woulG not only allow tKe
compliance proJram to Ee oYerVeen Ey EoarG memEerV tKat KaYe GeYelopeG
e[pertiVe in compliance anG enVure EoarG memEerV GeYote Vufficient time to
tKe topic,
9
Eut it alVo KelpV eVtaEliVK tKe leJitimacy of tKe compliance
function anG itV importance to tKe orJani]ation One compliance conVultinJ
9. See infra noteV 90±10
90 JameV $ Fanto, The Governing Authority’s Responsibilities in Compliance and Risk
Management, as Seen in the American Law Institute’s Draft Principles of Compliance, Risk
Management, and Enforcement, 90 7EM3 L REV 99, 11±12 201
91. Id. at 1±14
92 6aEine Vollmer, The Board’s Role in Promoting an Ethical Culture, J $CCOUN7$NCY
July 1, 201, KttpVwwwMournalofaccountancycomiVVueV201MulcorporateEoarGrole
etKicalcultureKtml 6ir :infrieG BiVcKoff, Why It’s Time Boards Faced Up to the Corporate
Culture Challenge, C,7Y $M Jan 12, 201, Kttpwwwcityamcom200wKyitVtime
EoarGVfaceGcorporateculturecKallenJe
9 Fanto, supra note 90, at 1±1
94. See 'aYiG +eVV, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 10 M,C+ L REV 11, 109 200 arJuinJ in faYor of an etKicV anG
compliance committee on tKe EoarG of GirectorV
9 .eYin ' CKen & $nGy :u, The Structure of Board Committees, 2±, 10, 24 +arYarG
BuV 6cK :orkinJ 3aper 102, 201, KttpVwwwKEVeGufaculty3uElication20FileV1
02B22ea9ea4f244afG042f2E4e0cpGf
9 EY Center for BoarG MatterV, Board Committees Evolve to Address New Challenges,
+$RV L 6C+ F ON COR3 *OVERN$NCE & F,N RE* FeE 1, 201,
KttpVcorpJoYlawKarYarGeGu2010201EoarGcommitteeVeYolYetoaGGreVVnew
cKallenJeV Compliance committeeV were moVt common in tKe KealtKcare 2 anG enerJy
2 VectorV Id. 11 of companieV KaG a riVk committee, wKicK may KaYe oYerlap witK tKe
compliance committee Id. 7KiV committee waV moVt common in tKe financial Vector  Id.
9 Fanto, supra note 90, at 1 +eVV, supra note 94, at 109
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orJani]ation interYieweG twentyVi[ CECOV anG tKeir finGinJV Vupport tKiV
neeG
9
7Ke orJani]ation Vummari]eG tKe CECOV¶ Jeneral opinionV aV
>M@oVt EoarGV VpenG only a limiteG time on etKicV anG compliance E&C
anG reTuire too little from Venior manaJement leaGerVKip in tKat reJarG,
VenGinJ tKe ViJnal tKat, GeVpite aVpirational VtatementV of company YalueV
anG EeKaYioral e[pectationV, etKicV anG compliance iV not a KiJK
operational priority CECOV receiYe little Girection from EoarGV anG
EelieYe tKeir EoarGV often fail to KaYe a Geep unGerVtanGinJ of etKicV anG
compliance initiatiYeV
99
$ VeconG neceVVary reform to Kelp protect tKe leJitimacy of compliance
iV eacK corporation VKoulG KaYe a VtanGalone CECO or eTuiYalent poVition
7KiV poVition VKoulG Ee Veparate from tKe leJal function anG report Girectly
to tKe compliance committee of tKe EoarG of GirectorV, wKicK incluGeV tKe
autKority to Kire anG fire tKe CECO
100
Many commentatorV KaYe weiJKeG
in on tKe GeEate of wKetKer tKe CECO VKoulG Ee inGepenGent of tKe Jeneral
counVel
101
7KiV $rticle aGGV tKe importance of leJitimacy to tKe neeG to
eleYate tKe role of tKe CECO ,f tKe CECO reportV Girectly to tKe EoarG anG
not tKe Jeneral counVel, ³>t@KiV reportinJ woulG alVo reflect tKe profeVVional
proMect of compliance officerV, wKo want tKeir poVition to Ee recoJni]eG aV
an inGepenGent internal control actiYity tKat iV JoYerneG Ey eVtaEliVKeG
principleV of practice anG tKat KaV tKe Vame autKority aV Go lawyerV anG
Jeneral counVelV of an orJani]ation´
102
7o KaYe tKe leJitimacy to Go tKeir
MoEV appropriately, CECOV neeG tKiV autKority anG VtatuV, aV well aV
inGepenGence 6ettinJ tKe tone from tKe top muVt not merely come from
CEO pronouncementV on company YalueV, Eut it muVt come from
commitmentV to compliance anG etKicV Ey eleYatinJ tKe role of tKe CECO
,n aGGition, if tKe CECO iV accountaEle only to tKe CEO, tKen a conflict
of intereVt ariVeV, aV tKe CECO may Ee placeG in a poVition of KaYinJ to call
out tKe unetKical EeKaYior of tKe Yery perVon tKe CECO¶V continueG
employment GepenGV upon
10
7KiV alVo createV potential leJitimacy
9 LRN, :+$7¶6 7+E 7ONE $7 7+E VERY 7O3" 7+E ROLE OF BO$R'6 ,N OVER6EE,N*
COR3OR$7E E7+,C6&COM3L,$NCE 4 201
99. Id.
100. See Fanto, supra note 90, at 1±1, 1 n122 VtatinJ tKat tKe $L, Compliance 3roMect
reTuireV tKat tKe EoarG of GirectorV muVt approYe tKe KirinJ anG GiVmiVVal of tKe CECO anG citinJ
feGeral reJulationV reTuirinJ tKe EoarG of reJiVtereG inYeVtment companieV to KaYe KirinJ anG
remoYal autKority oYer tKe CECO, anG Vimilar reTuirementV unGer tKe CommoGity FutureV
7raGinJ CommiVVion¶V reJulationV for futureV commiVVion mercKantV, Vwap GealerV, anG maMor
Vwap participantV
101. See RoEert C BirG & 6tepKen .im 3ark, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of
Compliance,  $M BU6 LJ 20, 204±0 201, for an oYerYiew of tKe arJumentV on EotK
ViGeV of tKe GeEate
102 Fanto, supra note 90, at 2
10 : MicKael +offman & Mark Rowe, The Ethics Officer as Agent of the Board: Leveraging
Ethical Governance Capability in the Post-Enron Corporation, 112 BU6 & 6OC REV , 
200 ³,f tKe >CECO¶V@ MoE or career iV GepenGent on tKe Yery people wKom Ke or VKe may neeG
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proElemV ,n reference to tKeVe potential conflictV of intereVtV,
commentatorV arJue
Not only can tKiV conflict interfere Girectly witK tKe >CECO¶V@ MuGJment
anG effectiYeneVV in monitorinJ tKe GeciVionV anG conGuct of manaJement,
Eut it miJKt alVo JiYe riVe to a perception amonJ employeeV Jenerally tKat
manaJement iV treateG Gifferently ,n tKat eYent, tKe >CECO¶V@ creGiEility
anG tKat of tKe etKicV anG compliance proJram iV at riVk
104
B MONITORIN* T+ECOMPLIANCE PROCE66 BY E9ALUATIN* T+E
ET+ICALCULTURE
CorporationV VKoulG Ee reTuireG to reJularly eYaluate tKeir etKical
culture
10
7KiV recommenGation focuVeV on KelpinJ enVure appropriate anG
onJoinJ monitorinJ of tKe etKical infraVtructure to preYent tKe compliance
proJram from cKippinJ away to a point wKere it KaV loVt leJitimacy witK
employeeV 7KiV Geterioration proceVV iV inViGiouV ,naGYertent cKallenJeV to
tKe CECO¶V autKority anG leJitimacy, e[ceptionV to compliance proJram
policieV, anG Vimilar actionV, place tKe compliance proJram on a Vlippery
Vlope to illeJitimacy unleVV tKe neeG for a GeliEerate interYention iV
recoJni]eG anG tKen VtaJeG MeaVurement of tKe etKical culture KelpV
corporate actorV recoJni]e wKen interYention iV neceVVary
7Ke corporation¶V etKical culture anG formal compliance proJram muVt
Vupport eacK otKer
10
7KiV $rticle empKaVi]eV tKe GanJerV of wKen tKey Go
not 7Kat iV, a formal compliance proJram in tKe miGVt of uncKeckeG
wronJGoinJ can leaG to an illeJitimate formal proJram anG furtKer an
unetKical corporate culture
10
ReTuireG eYaluationV of a corporate culture
can Kelp proYiGe tKe CECO anG EoarG of GirectorV witK early warninJV of
tKiV GownVliGe anG allow tKem to Vtructure appropriate interYentionV ,t iV
important to note tKat witKout tKeVe mecKaniVmV, top manaJement iV
typically tKe laVt Jroup of employeeV to know aEout proElemV witK tKe
culture
10
7Ke reVearcK on tKiV topic KaV founG
>7@Kat Venior manaJerV KaYe ViJnificantly more poVitiYe perceptionV of
orJani]ational etKicV wKen compareG to rankanGfile employeeV 6enior
manaJerV are leVV likely to Vee etKicV initiatiYeV cynically anG are more
to call to account in reVpect of tKeir own etKical conGuct, tKere iV immeGiately a poVViEility tKat tKe
EO will Ee influenceG Ey perVonal intereVt conVciouVly or VuEconVciouVly anG KiV or Ker
oEMectiYity or inGepenGence will Ee compromiVeG´ Id.
104. Id.
10 For Vimplicity, tKiV $rticle will uVe tKe termV ³etKical culture´ anG ³etKical climate´
intercKanJeaEly By ³reTuireG,´ , am incluGinJ, for e[ample, tKe VtronJ incentiYeV companieV
KaYe to follow tKe OrJani]ational 6entencinJ *uiGelineV¶ GeVcription of an effectiYe compliance
proJram +eVV, supra note 1, at 2±2
10. See 7enEruVel et al, supra noteV 4± GiVcuVVinJ tKe etKical infraVtructure moGel
10. See supra 3art ,,
10 LinGa .leEe 7reYixo et al, Regulating for Ethical Culture,  BE+$V 6C, & 3OL¶Y , 2
201
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likely to perceiYe tKe internal etKical enYironment to Ee VupportiYe of
etKical conGuct in tKe orJani]ation 7Key are alVo more likely to EelieYe
tKat employeeV will raiVe etKical iVVueV anG report etKical proElemV to
manaJement
109
,n aGGition, reTuirinJ meaVurement of tKe company¶V etKical culture,
VucK aV tKrouJK tKe OrJani]ational 6entencinJ *uiGelineV, makeV it a
reVponViEility of tKe compliance committee anG tKe CECO 7KiV KelpV
enVure tKe eYaluation JetV completeG in a meaninJful way, aV tKe committee
anG tKe CECO will Ee KelG accountaEle for tKiV actiYity ,n many
orJani]ationV, tKiV work iV not Gone EecauVe it iV not YieweG aV part of tKe
CECO¶V role
110
,n aGGition, tKiV reTuirement KelpV Jrant leJitimacy to tKe
CECO¶V claim tKat meaVurinJ anG KelpinJ manaJe tKe corporate culture aV
it relateV to etKicV iV EotK important anG part of tKe CECO¶V GutieV
111
Finally, VKareKolGerV are VKowinJ an intereVt in tKe meaVurement anG
eYaluation of corporate culture Gue to itV impact on company Yalue,
112
anG
tKiV propoVal furtKerV tKeir aEility to proYiGe e[ternal monitorinJ
ReformV are alreaGy moYinJ in tKiV Girection For e[ample, tKe 201
YerVion of tKe U. Corporate *oYernance CoGe VtateV, ³7Ke EoarG VKoulG
eVtaEliVK tKe company¶V purpoVe, YalueV anG VtrateJy, anG VatiVfy itVelf tKat
tKeVe anG itV culture are aliJneG´
11
7Ke commentary proYiVionV furtKer
Vtate
7Ke EoarG VKoulG aVVeVV anG monitor culture :Kere it iV not VatiVfieG tKat
policy, practiceV or EeKaYiour tKrouJKout tKe EuVineVV are aliJneG witK tKe
company¶V purpoVe, YalueV anG VtrateJy, it VKoulG Veek aVVurance tKat
109 LinGa .leEe 7reYixo, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 0
BROO. L REV 119, 1209 200
110 +eVV, supra note 1, at 4
7Ke compliance Gepartment moVt commonly KaV reVponViEility for compliance traininJ,
oYerViJKt of tKe orJani]ation¶V coGe of conGuct, tKe wKiVtleElower Kotline, anG
compliance inYeVtiJationV Few compliance GepartmentV, KoweYer, KaYe reVponViEility
for aVVeVVinJ tKe orJani]ation¶V culture $nG, if no one in tKe orJani]ation KaV
reVponViEility for tKiV aVVeVVment, tKen it GoeV not Jet Gone, anG at EeVt JetV replaceG Ey
Jeneral reportV
Id citationV omitteG
111. Id. at ±
112. See Letter from CyruV 7araporeYala, 3reViGent & CEO of 6tate 6treet *loEal $GYiVorV to
BoarG MemEerV Jan 1, 2019, KttpVwwwVVJacominYeVtmenttopicVenYironmentalVocial
JoYernance2019012019203ro[y20Letter
$liJninJ20Corporate20Culture20witK20LonJ7erm206trateJypGf GeVcriEinJ 6tate
6treet¶V new effortV to enVure tKat corporate EoarGV are aEle to articulate Kow tKeir companieV¶
culture iV aliJneG witK tKeir lonJterm VtrateJy, anG VtatinJ ³flaweG corporate culture KaV reVulteG
in KiJKprofile caVeV of e[ceVViYe riVktakinJ or unetKical EeKaYiorV tKat neJatiYely impact lonJ
term performance´
11 F,N RE3OR7,N*COUNC,L, 7+EU.COR3OR$7E*OVERN$NCE CO'E 4 3rinciple B July
201, KttpVwwwfrcorJukJetattacKmentEGc40ea4419E0G2f4f409a2201U.
Corporate*oYernanceCoGeF,N$L3'F
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manaJement KaV taken correctiYe action 7Ke annual report VKoulG e[plain
tKe EoarG¶V actiYitieV anG any action taken
114
:KetKer tKe Gata from tKe culture eYaluation VKoulG Ee VKareG witK
VtakeKolGerV otKer tKan tKe EoarG of GirectorV iV EeyonG tKe Vcope of tKiV
$rticle ,t iV important to note, KoweYer, tKat tKere are alternatiYeV to puElic
GiVcloVure For e[ample, one propoVal VuJJeVtV tKat eacK inGuVtry VKoulG
create ³an inGepenGent tKirGparty orJani]ation to VerYe aV a neutral
reVearcK entity tKat conGuctV aVVeVVmentV anG facilitateV communication of
tKeir reVultV Eetween tKe inGuVtry anG reJulatorV´
11
Finally, tKe meaVurement of corporate culture VKoulG not Ee a onetime
actiYity 7Ke culture muVt Ee monitoreG on a continual EaViV ,n aGGition,
after a proElem iV uncoYereG, tKe corporation muVt, of courVe, GeViJn
appropriate interYentionV, Eut it muVt alVo monitor wKetKer tKe interYention
iV workinJ
11
7Ke reTuireG eYaluation proceVV KelpV top manaJement
unGerVtanG Kow tKeir actionV may Ee unintentionally unGermininJ tKe
compliance proJram, enVureV tKey are KelG accountaEle for remeGiation,
anG KelpV tKe CECO uVe Gata to GemonVtrate wKen tKere iV a proElem anG
wKen interYentionV are effectiYe
CONCLU6ION
MaintaininJ tKe leJitimacy of tKe compliance proJram anG tKe CECO iV
of paramount importance $n illeJitimate compliance proJram iV not MuVt
ineffectiYe, Eut it can leaG to more unetKical anG illeJal conGuct, wKetKer in
tKe entire orJani]ation or in VuEcultureV of Gifferent GepartmentV anG
JeoJrapKic reJionV ,n recoJnition of tKe GanJerV of allowinJ a compliance
proJram¶V leJitimacy to cKip away, tKiV $rticle pointV to a EoarG leYel
VtanGinJ committee on compliance, an inGepenGent CECO, anG a
manGatory eYaluation of tKe corporation¶V etKical culture, aV neceVVary
reformV
114. Id.
11 7reYixo et al, supra note 10, at 
11. Id. at 
